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Abstract
To evaluate the effectiveness of targeting monetary policy strategies in a small open economy, we
develop a dynamic optimizing model calibrated to recent Korean data. We then explore the conse-
quences of alternative speciﬁcations of the loss function for society and the central bank, with par-
ticular focus on exchange rate volatility. Policy simulations include variations on inﬂation targeting,
nominal income growth targeting and exchange rate targeting. Our results indicate that inﬂation
targeting remains the most preferred policy regime, even when an explicit motive for exchange rate
smoothingisintroduced. Inthiscase,theoptimalinﬂationtargetingandnominalincomegrowthtar-
geting policies are characterized by a “conservative” central bank that places greater weight on both
the primary target variable and on the exchange rate than in society’s objective function. However,
the optimal policy reacts to changes in degree of exchange rate pass-though in a non-linear fashion,
complicating the robustness of inﬂation targeting recommendations for emerging markets.
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Sincetheearly1990’s,severalcountrieshaveadoptedinﬂationtargetingastheirframeworkformonetary
policy. In the the wake of the 1997 Financial Crisis, Korea was among the ﬁrst of a growing number of
emerging market economies to begin targeting inﬂation explicitly. In this paper, we analyze the Korean
experience in the context of the extensive theoretical literature in monetary economics that explores the
optimality of inﬂation targeting. While much of this work has been conducted with closed economy
models, increasing interest has been given to small open economies, and, more recently still, to the
situation of emerging market economies (EMEs). The analysis in this paper expands that exploration
speciﬁcally to the case of Korea. We ﬁnd the particular experience of Korea interesting in its own right,
as well as a potential guide to issues that might confront other inﬂation targeting EMEs.
On a theoretical level, a broad consensus appears to have formed in the literature regarding the de-
sirability of inﬂation targeting as a monetary framework.1 Nonetheless, some recent research has ques-
tioned the optimality of inﬂation targeting in all circumstances. Speciﬁcally focusing on small open
economies, McCallum and Nelson (1999) argued in favor of nominal income targeting over inﬂation tar-
geting. One attractive feature of the macroeconomic model they develop is an emphasis on imported
goods as inputs into production, rather than as ﬁnal consumption goods (as modeled, for example, in
Clarida et al., 2001, and Galí and Monacelli, 2002): for Korea, consumer goods comprised only 13% of
imports in 2002; capital equipment and intermediate goods accounted for the remaining 87%. In sec-
tion 2, we start with the speciﬁcation of McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001) to develop a micro-founded
dynamic stochastic model calibrated to the Korean economy.2
However, in contrast with McCallum and Nelson (1999), we model the central bank as a dynami-
cally optimizing agent acting under discretion, rather than imposing an estimated policy rule.3 Using
the technique of Dennis (2003), we simulate the impact of alternative speciﬁcations of the societal ob-
jective function. For a particular speciﬁcation of this loss function these simulations yield the optimal
discretionary monetary policy. Using a similar approach in a closed-economy framework, Jensen (2002)
1Whether inﬂation targeting has signiﬁcantly improved economic outcomes of practicing countries is actively debated; see
Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Levin et al. (2003) for recent contributions. Truman (2003) reports that ﬁve of seven emerging
market economies exhibited higher inﬂation or real output growth volatility following the adoption of inﬂation targeting.
2Recently, a similar but independent approach based on this model has been undertaken by Fraga et al. (2003) for the case
of Brazil. One main modeling distinction is our use of a modiﬁed open-economy version of the price-setting relationship of
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), as explained below.
3Given the short period in which inﬂation targeting has been in effect, it is difﬁcult to estimate a Taylor-type policy rule with
any precision. Extending the sample to earlier years would be inappropriate in light of the regime change(s).
1recentlyconcludedthattheoptimalpolicyregimemaybenominalincomegrowth—andnotinﬂation—
targeting. In light of the results of both McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Jensen (2002), we compare in-
ﬂation targeting and nominal income growth targeting regimes in section 2.
We also give particular attention to the role of the exchange rate in policy formulation. In the canon-
ical open economy New Neo-Classical Synthesis model, the exchange rate carries the primary burden
of adjustment to return the model economy back to its steady state following an exogenous shock. As
Svensson(1998)andKollmann(2002)havenoted,the(nominalandreal)exchangerateisquitevolatilein
suchmodels, aresultwecanreplicateforourbaselineparameterization. However, exchangeratevolatil-
ity can carry a signiﬁcant cost in emerging markets. While a stable currency and stable prices need not
be conﬂicting objectives (particularly over long horizons), there certainly can arise situations in which a
response to currency market innovations would run counter to placing primacy on the inﬂation criteria.
Mishkin (2000) notes that exchange rate stability may be of particular importance to emerging market
economies, especially in the face of “currency mismatches” in which a large devaluation of the domestic
currency can signiﬁcantly worsen the balance sheets of private ﬁrms and possibly precipitate a ﬁnancial
crisis, such as occurred in Korea in 1997 – 1998.4 Indeed, the monetary policies of many EMEs exhibit
“fear of ﬂoating” behavior, as documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Thus, in section 3 we also in-
vestigate motives for, and the consequences of, explicit exchange rate objectives in the speciﬁcation of
the central bank’s loss function. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Speciﬁcation
To investigate the properties of inﬂation targeting and other monetary policy regimes in Korea, we em-
ploy a macroeconomic model of a small open economy based upon McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001).
Rather than repeating their derivations, below we note the main equations as well as any signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between our speciﬁcation and theirs. One key departure is the price adjustment equation: we
derive an open-economy version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) that is consistent with our assumptions
about the nature of production.
In the model, a continuum of households (ﬁrms) produce differentiated products for domestic con-
sumption and export using labor (provided inelastically by each household) and imported intermediate
4Amato and Gerlach (2002) also investigate how exchange rate volatility can signiﬁcantly complicate the implementation of
inﬂation targeting monetary policy in emerging market economies. For a more critical view of the importance of exchange rate
issues for inﬂation targeting in emerging markets, see Truman (2003).









where Yt is aggregate output (GDP), At is an exogenous technology variable, Nt is labor input, and IMt
representsimportedintermediategoodsusedintheproductionofﬁnalaggregateoutput. Inrecentyears
nearly 90% of Korea’s imports were inputs into production rather than consumption goods. Thus, for
simplicity, we follow McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001) and model imported goods solely as productive
inputs; domestic households only consume domestic goods. Notice that in this case, (1−α) can be
interpreted as a measure of “openness” of the domestic economy.







where j indexes the households and θ is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated goods.







The household also purchases (one-period) bonds, denominated in the domestic currency, Bt, and
in the foreign currency, B∗
t . These bonds respectively pay real interest rt and r∗
t at maturity. Foreign-
currency denominated bonds also pay an exogenous risk premium, κt.
Thus the household, acting as both a differentiated goods producer and a representative consumer,






















Domestic production is sold either to domestic consumers (Dt) or exported abroad (EXt). Households
supply labor NS
t in exchange for the real wage Wt
±
P A
t . In addition to purchasing the composite con-
sumption good, as a producer the household (ﬁrm) purchases labor services and imported intermediate
goods as factors of production. The real exchange rate, Qt, measures the relative price of foreign goods
3in terms of domestic production. In equilibrium, the general price level corresponds with the aggregate
index of ﬁnal goods prices set by ﬁrms (P A
t =Pt) and labor supply equals labor demand (NS
t = ND
t ).5










where ωt is an exogenous preference (demand) shock. To solve the model, we linearize the ﬁrst-order
conditions from the household’s optimization problem around the non-stochastic steady state and im-
pose equilibrium conditions.
The Euler equation for consumption can be expressed in a log-linearized form as:
ct =Etct+1−σ−1(it −Etπt+1)+νt , (4)
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, (it −Etπt+1) is the ex ante real inter-
estrate,andνt isapreferenceshock(afunctionofωt).6 Domesticrealoutputisthesumofconsumption
andexports, linearizedaroundthenon-stochasticsteady-state. Werepresentexportsasafunctionofthe
real exchange rate and foreign output, so the domestic output identity can be approximated as:







is the steady-state share of consumption in output.7 ηq and ηy∗ are the price and
income elasticities of real export demand, respectively.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem for bond holding, an un-
covered interest parity condition can be derived:
it =i∗
t +Et∆st+1+κt , (6)
5As labor is supplied inelastically by households, we normalize NS = 1. In the ﬂexible price case below, all workers are
employed. In the sticky price case, output is demand-determined and generally less than its natural level, thus: ND
t ≤ NS
t =1.
6Lower-case letters are used to signify the logarithmic deviations of variables from their steady-state values.
7Capital letters without time subscripts represent steady-state values.
4where st isthelogofthenominalexchangerate,deﬁnedasSt =Qt(Pt/P∗
t ). Boththeforeigninterestrate,
i∗
t , and the risk premium shock, κt, are treated as exogenous with respect to the small open economy.
On the supply side, log linearizing equation (1) for production yields:
yt =(1−δ)(at +nt)+δimt ,
where δ = (1−α)(IM/Y )−ρ. In a (symmetric) ﬂexible-price equilibrium, output achieves its “potential”
level, Y t, which implies that
yt =(1−δ)at +δimt . (7)
With ﬂexible prices the markup rate will be constant; in conjunction with the ﬁrst-order condition for
import demand by ﬁrms yields the following relationship between the (log) real exchange rate and the
(log) ratio of imports to GDP:
qt =−(1+ρ)(imt −yt). (8)
Equations (7) and (8) imply potential output is determined as:










the real exchange rate, qt, as well as an exogenous technology shock, at. The output gap is then deﬁned
as e yt = yt −yt.
The ﬂexible price equilibrium deﬁnes a baseline situation for the model. The ﬁrms in our model
produce differentiated products that enter positively into the consumption bundle of the representative
household, so these ﬁrms have market power that allows them to set prices. Following much of the New
Neoclassical Consensus literature, we posit that ﬁrms do not adjust their prices every period. Although
we remain agnostic about the source of such price rigidities, for convenience we adopt the approach of
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) for the determination of the aggregate price level and inﬂation dynamics.
Unlike Fuhrer and Moore (1995), our production function in equation (1) includes both labor and
















For simplicity, assuming that the wage contracts are ﬁxed for two periods and re-negotiated by one-half
of the ﬁrm’s workers each period (as in Fuhrer and Moore, 1995), the log linear approximation for the







over the length of the employment contract.8 As a result, the current contract wage (in real terms) is a
weighted average of past and expected future real contract wages — adjusted for excess demand as mea-







+φ e yt . (11)





(πt−1+Etπt+1)+φ(e yt + e yt−1)+χ(∆pIM
t −Et∆pIM
t+1). (12)
Under complete exchange-rate pass through, PIM
t = P∗
t ·St. We assume that P∗
t , the foreign price of
the imported goods, is exogenous with respect to a small open economy like Korea. More generally, we
allow for an exogenous deviation from the law of one price, as in Monacelli (2003). Such a speciﬁcation
gives rise to an exogenous shock in equation (12), denoted below by µt, that resembles a “cost-push”
shock like that cited by Clarida et al. (2001) and others as the source of a meaningful trade-off between
output and inﬂation stabilization. Thus, the equation for inﬂation dynamics in our model is:
πt =λπt−1+(1−λ)Etπt+1+φ(e yt + e yt−1)+χ(∆st −Et∆st+1)+µt . (13)
Notice we also have generalized the relative weights on future and past inﬂation in this speciﬁcation,
which allows us to examine the robustness of our ﬁndings to more general speciﬁcations of the relative
importance of the forward- and backward-looking components of the inﬂation process.
To close the model, we again follow McCallum and Nelson (1999) and assume an exogenous AR(1)
8Note that wages are still negotiated in nominal terms.
6process for foreign output, y∗
t , while assuming foreign prices and interest rates are exogenously held
constant. We also assume that shocks to technology, preferences, the risk premium, and inﬂation (the
“cost push” shock) follow exogenous AR(1) processes:
y∗













The baseline parameter values for the simulations in the next section are based primarily on data
and research on the Korean economy. They are discussed in some detail in the appendix.
3 Policy Simulations
Equations (4), (5), (6), (9) and (13), derived from the intertemporal optimizing choices of households in
equilibrium, form the basis of the log linearized model that we simulate in this section and the next.
These structural equations, as well as the AR(1) processes for the exogenous shocks (and appropriate
identities) can be written in the following matrix form:9
A0yt =A1yt−1+A2Etyt+1+A3xt +A4Etxt+1+A5vt (14)
whereyt isthe(n×1)vectorofendogenousvariables,includingthestructuraldisturbances(at, νt, µt, κt, y∗
t ).







t ) is distributed as:









σa 0 0 0 0
0 σν 0 0 0
0 0 σµ 0 0
0 0 0 σκ 0








9The Aj matrices are deﬁned conformably, given the equations for the exogenous processes and endogenous variables.
7In equation (14), xt represents the (p ×1) vector of policy variables. For most of the simulations
below, the central bank is assumed to use the interest rate, it, as the sole instrument of policy.10 The
BankofKorea’spolicyinstrumentisashort-termrate. Laterweconsideralternativepolicyarrangements
in which the exchange rate can be viewed as the primary instrument of monetary policy.











subject to the constraints imposed by the structure of the economy, summarized in equation (14).
Wesolvethejointintertemporaloptimizationproblemestablishedabovebyutilizingtheapproachof
Dennis(2003). Thistechniqueallowsonetoﬁndsolutionsunderbothoptimaldiscretionaryandoptimal
precommitment policies. Given the relatively recent adoption of inﬂation targeting in Korea, we ﬁnd the
discretionary case more analogous to the current situation facing the Bank of Korea.11
3.1 Simulation Results: Flexible Targeting
To this point, we have not speciﬁed the values for the objective function (W and Q in equation 15). Fol-
lowingotherworkinthisliterature, weassumehouseholdswishtostabilizeoutputaroundpotentialand
the inﬂation rate around a target (normalized to zero). That is, we consider “ﬂexible” targeting regimes.
We normalize the weight on inﬂation in society’s loss function to one in the W matrix.
Given a speciﬁcation of the loss function for society, the central bank chooses its policy parameters
tominimizethislossfunction. Weallowthecentralbanktohaveweightsthatdifferfromthoseofsociety,
as well as various policy instruments and primary targets: our modeling framework can accommodate
inﬂationtargeting(IT),nominalincomegrowthtargeting(NIGT),andexchangeratemanagement. Each
of these three regimes is illustrated in table 1 for two different benchmark values of the relative weight
on the output gap in society’s objective function.12
Whensociety’sobjectivefunctiondependsonlyoninﬂation(whoseweightisnormalizedtoone)and
10That is, p =1. Notice that there is no explicit role for monetary aggregates in this model.
11Results for the precommitment case are available upon request from the authors. The main advantage of following Dennis
(2003) is that alternative approaches, such as Söderlind (1999), do not permit solutions of our model when the inﬂation dy-
namics (equation 13) include the change in the nominal exchange rate. For the case χ=0, we have conﬁrmed that Söderlind’s
approach can reproduce those found with Dennis’s technique.
12These values are common reference points in the literature. Because the weights are relative, we scale the central bank’s
weight onthe output gap in each case to coincide with that of society, and solve for the optimal weight on the primary objective
of the central bank: inﬂation, nominal income growth, or the change in the nominal exchange rate. This approach leads to a
natural interpretation of the resulting optimal weights for the central bank as “conservative” or not, as discussed below.
8Table 1: Optimal Policy: Flexible Targeting Regimes
Inﬂation Nominal Income Exchange
Target Growth Target Rate Target
Weight on
output gap 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.25
Optimal central
bank weight on 1.48 1.45 0.13 0.43 0.04 0.18
target variable
Societal loss 0.441 2.185 4.967 6.801 10.776 12.264
Notes: Forinﬂationandnominalincomegrowthtargeting, thenominalshort-terminterestrate, it, isthepolicy
variable, xt. For exchange rate targeting, the nominal exchange rate, st, is the policy variable.
the output gap (with the relative weights given in table 1), the best policy for the central bank (given the
parameterized model developed in the previous section) is inﬂation targeting. The ability of a “conser-
vative” central bank — i.e. one whose relative weight on inﬂation exceeds that of the societal loss func-
tion — to address the time consistency problem inherent under discretionary policy is conﬁrmed here.
In contrast with Jensen (2002) or Bae and Ratti (2003), nominal income growth targeting is a less desir-
able policy in the sense that it results in a larger loss to society. This difference likely is due to the lack of
a backward-looking (lagged) component in the output gap speciﬁcation.13 If the central bank pegs the
exchange rate — in a ﬂexible manner that allows it to respond to ﬂuctuations in the output gap — but
does not respond directly to inﬂation (that is, inﬂation is not an explicit argument in the central bank’s
loss function), the loss to society is even larger.
Toillustratewhythesevariouspoliciesexhibitsuchdifferentlossesforsocietyinourbaselinespeciﬁ-
cation,table2showsthestandarddeviationsoftheendogenousvariablesimpliedbyeachpolicyregime.
Both nominal income growth targeting and exchange rate targeting are far less successful in stabilizing
the inﬂation rate (annualized here to facilitate comparison with the data) than is inﬂation targeting;
given the relatively large weight on inﬂation in society’s loss function these policies yield substantially
higher losses than inﬂation targeting. Neither nominal income growth targeting nor exchange rate tar-
geting manage to offset the much higher inﬂation rate with substantially lower volatility in the output
gap; indeed; NIGT worsens the variability of both arguments of society’s loss function.
In all three policy regimes, placing greater weight on the output gap reveals a “Taylor curve” trade-
13McCallum and Nelson (1999) allow for the possibility of habit formation in consumption, which would introduce such
persistence. We plan to investigate the consequences of such a speciﬁcation in subsequent research.
9Table 2: Simulation Results: Flexible Targeting Regimes
Standard deviations, reported as percentage deviations from steady-state
Inﬂation Nominal Income Exchange
Target Growth Target Rate Target
Weight on
output gap 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.25
πt ×4 0.12 0.60 8.56 8.59 13.10 13.12
e yt 2.99 2.97 3.07 3.03 2.76 2.73
it ×4 19.70 19.95 16.81 16.85 19.77 19.88
∆xt 2.05 2.06 0.35 0.52 3.26 3.29
∆st 2.22 2.19 2.62 2.57 1.24 1.32
yt 2.98 3.00 3.34 3.36 3.71 3.70
yt 4.03 4.03 3.99 3.98 3.90 3.90
ct 2.87 2.88 3.14 3.15 3.27 3.26
qt 9.08 9.21 10.02 10.17 12.46 12.44
Notes: See table 1 notes.
off between stabilization of the output gap and of inﬂation. The effect on the variability of the other
endogenous variables of increasing the relative weight on the output gap is not uniform, but depends on
which policy regime is adopted by the central bank.
3.2 Simulation Results: Exchange Rate Objectives
The previous simulation results involve a high degree of variability in the nominal interest rate, and, to
a lesser extent, the exchange rates. As was discussed previously, such situations may be particularly un-
palatable in emerging market economies. As a result, we now consider situations in which the volatility
of the exchange rate enters the loss functions the central bank or society (or both).
Situations in which the central bank alone possesses an explicit target for the exchange rate are
treated as “extrinsic” exchange rate objectives. That is, the reasons why the central bank might target
the exchange rate largely reside outside the model. These include signaling or reputation effects: to the
extent that movements in the exchange rate may be interpreted by ﬁnancial markets as indicators of the
stanceorcredibilityofmonetarypolicy,thecentralbankmaywishtodirectlymanageexchangerateﬂuc-
tuations. The potential costs of ﬁnancial fragility, which may be exacerbated by volatile exchange rates
in emerging market economies, are additional motivation for explicit concern about exchange rates by
10policymakers.14 Whileequation(9)doessuggestthatalargedepreciationoftherealexchangeratecould
signiﬁcantly lower potential output, modeling of the effect of exchange rate crises on the level of output
through a credit channel is beyond the scope of this paper and an area for future research.
An alternative theoretical reason for the exchange rate to explicitly enter into the loss function of
society (and the central bank) follows from our particular speciﬁcation of imported intermediate goods
in production. We label this an “intrinsic” motivation for a distinct exchange rate objective on behalf
of both society and the central bank, as it follows from the model speciﬁcation. In the canonical New
Neo-Classical Synthesis model, the forward-looking nature of the price setting relationship implies sta-
bilization of the variability of the output gap is an important means for stabilization of inﬂation expec-
tations. In this model, the output gap and the exchange rate (as proxies for marginal costs) both warrant
attention from the central bank in order to stabilize inﬂation expectations. Variability in both measures
preclude ﬁrms who infrequently adjust prices from achieving their optimal levels of output. Other small
open economy models in the literature do not include this channel.
Finally, the recent evidence of “fear of ﬂoating” behavior in many emerging market economies (see
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) justiﬁes an investigation of the potential costs of such behavior. Such an anal-
ysis can be informative even in the absence of any theoretical justiﬁcation for such behavior. That is,
regardless of the particular reasons why a central bank might care about exchange rate ﬂuctuations, the
fact that such behavior does occur warrants further investigation of it.
To this end, table 3 considers the effects of introducing some degree of concern into the objective
function of ﬁrst the central bank and then society. For two common weights on the output gap (0.05 and
0.25), we vary society’s weight on exchange rate stabilization from zero to one-half. The parameteriza-
tions of the societal objective function are shown in the ﬁrst two rows of table 3. Given these speciﬁca-
tions, the central bank optimally choses both the weight on inﬂation and the weight on exchange rate
stabilization. The case in which the societal weight on the exchange rate equals zero represents cases in
which the central bank’s motivation for exchange rate smoothing is “extrinsic;” the remaining cases are
“intrinsic,” in the sense discussed above.
For the “extrinsic” targeting cases, the optimal weight on the exchange rate for the central bank turns
out to be quite small. However, as was found in table 1 earlier, the optimal policy has a strongly “con-
servative” weight on inﬂation, roughly 50% greater than society’s weight of one. As society’s concern
14Analogously, in recent years the U.S. Federal Reserve has acted in response to domestic stock market crashes or interna-
tional liquidity crises, yet such events are not a standard part of a tractable theoretical model.
11Table 3: Simulation Results: Inﬂation Targeting Regimes with Exchange Rate Smoothing
Standard deviations reported as percentage deviations from steady-state
Weights in societal objective function
e y 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
∆s 0.0 0.05 0.25 0.5 0.0 0.05 0.25 0.5
Optimal weights in central bank’s loss function
π 1.51 1.25 0.89 0.90 1.46 1.41 1.29 1.28
∆st 0.001 0.06 0.21 0.44 0.002 0.07 0.30 0.61
Value of societal loss function
0.441 0.677 1.520 2.402 2.185 2.414 3.237 4.104
Standard deviations of endogenous variables
πt ×4 0.12 0.37 1.40 2.45 0.60 0.76 1.61 2.56
e yt 2.99 2.98 2.96 2.95 2.97 2.96 2.94 2.93
it ×4 19.70 19.68 19.62 19.56 19.70 19.69 19.63 19.57
∆xt 2.05 2.03 2.00 2.00 2.06 2.04 2.02 2.01
∆st 2.22 2.17 1.99 1.81 2.19 2.14 1.97 1.80
yt 2.98 2.99 3.04 3.09 3.00 3.02 3.06 3.11
yt 4.03 4.03 4.02 4.01 4.03 4.02 4.02 4.01
ct 2.87 2.88 2.90 2.93 2.88 2.89 2.91 2.94
qt 9.08 9.15 9.38 9.62 9.21 9.26 9.47 9.69
Notes: See table 1 notes.
for exchange rate stability increases, the central bank places progressively less weight on the inﬂation
objective and greater weight on the exchange rate. There is a signiﬁcant difference between the case in
which the weight on the output gap in the loss function (of both society and the central bank) is 0.05
and 0.25: in the latter case, the behavior of the central is “conservative” with respect to both the inﬂation
and exchange rate objectives, in the sense that both central bank’s weightings exceed those for society.
However, in the former case the optimal policy calls for the central bank to act more like a “dove” than a
“hawk” towards both variables for the cases in which the weight on ∆s in society’s loss function exceeds
0.05. We explore this aspect further in the next subsection.
Not surprisingly, the more weight that is placed on objectives other than inﬂation, the more volatile
is the inﬂation rate. While adding additional weight to either the output gap or exchange rate smoothing
objectives results in slightly less variation in both of these variables, the effect is small relative to the
increase in inﬂation volatility. As a result, the value of the loss function rises.
12Table 4: Effect of Variation in Inﬂation Expectation Formation on Optimal Policy, Extrinsic Cases
λ 0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1
0.05 weight on output gap, e y
Optimal weight on π 1.35 1.63 1.51 1.47 1.33
Optimal weight on ∆st 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Societal Loss 0.441 0.441 0.441 0.438 0.436
0.25 weight on output gap, e y
Optimal weight on π 1.34 1.63 1.46 1.32 1.06
Optimal weight on ∆st 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11
Societal Loss 2.202 2.206 2.185 2.129 2.067
3.3 Simulation Results: Robustness
The speciﬁcation of the dynamics of inﬂation ought to play a fundamental role in the determination of
the optimal monetary policy regime. In this section we investigate the sensitivity of the coefﬁcients in
the optimal policy to variation in two key parameters of equation (13).
First we examine variation in λ, the coefﬁcient on the lagged inﬂation rate in equation (13). The
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model of two-period staggered wage setting results in a value of one-half for
λ. Alternative speciﬁcations of the nature of price setting yield equations similar in structure to equa-
tion (13), but with different values for λ. For example, forward-looking ﬁrms in a Calvo model of optimal
price setting yield a New Keynesian Phillips Curve with λ = 0. If some ﬁrms are assumed to be “rule-of-
thumb” price setters in this framework, values of λ greater than zero can arise. For example, Galí and
Gertler (1999) estimate a “hybrid” New Keynesian Phillips Curve and ﬁnd empirical support for λ≈0.2.
Table 4 reports the sensitivity of the optimal policy weights and the resulting minimized value of
the societal loss function as λ varies between 0 and 1. In table 4 we presume the objective function for
society includes only inﬂation and the output gap. The central bank is allowed to engage in smoothing
the exchange rate based on “extrinsic” concerns — although it chooses to place a non-trivial weight on
this objective only in the case in which price setters are primarily backward-looking. As λ rises from zero
to one, the societal loss function evaluated at the optimal policy declines slightly, suggesting that it is
easier for an optimizing central bank under discretion to stabilize inﬂation expectations (in particular)
the larger the proportion of “rule of thumb” price setters. Moreover, as λ rises, the optimal weight on the
“extrinsic” exchange rate objective rises as well, albeit to very low levels.
Table5considerstwopossible“intrinsic”casesforexchangeratestabilizationinwhichsocietyplaces
13Table 5: Effect of Variation in Inﬂation Expectation Formation on Optimal Policy, Intrinsic Cases
λ 0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1
0.05 weight on e y and ∆s
Optimal weight on π 1.15 1.41 1.25 1.28 1.33
Optimal weight on ∆st 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
Societal Loss 0.671 0.673 0.677 0.679 0.680
0.25 weight on e y and ∆s
Optimal weight on π 1.18 1.37 1.29 1.32 1.45
Optimal weight on ∆st 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.21
Societal Loss 3.141 3.177 3.237 3.291 3.315
equal weight on stabilizing both the output gap and the exchange rate. In general, the optimal behavior
of the central bank is to be “conservative” with respect to both the inﬂation rate and exchange rate ob-
jectives regardless of the value of λ. As above, the greater the relative weight society places on stabilizing
the exchange rate, the less “conservative” the optimal central bank policy with respect to inﬂation. Qual-
itatively, tables 4 and 5 conﬁrm that the nature of the optimal policy is largely invariant to the degree of
forward- or backward-looking behavior in inﬂation.
The second parameter whose variation we examine in more detail is χ. This parameter is an increas-
ing (non-linear) function of the measure of openness, α, and the degree of exchange rate pass through.
For concreteness, we consider variation in χ between zero and one, which should be thought of as re-
ﬂecting changes in the exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcient for a given α.15
In ﬁgure 1 we plot the effect of varying χ in the baseline model, ceteris paribus, for a societal loss
function with a weight of one on inﬂation and 0.25 on the output gap. The optimal policy for the central
bank searches over weights for both the inﬂation rate and the exchange rate, although the latter are
generally quite small; for values of χ between roughly 0.18 and 0.75 they are effectively zero. The most
signiﬁcant ﬁnding in ﬁgure 1 is the non-linear effect of varying the degree of exchange rate pass-through
on the optimal weight on inﬂation for the central bank (acting under discretion). In particular, over
moderate ranges of pass-through (from 0.2 to nearly 0.4), the central bank can minimize the social loss
function by behaving more like a “dove” on inﬂation — choosing a weight less than one — than as a
“hawk” (relative to society’s preferences for inﬂation stabilization). But as χ increases from one-third to
one-half,theoptimalweightoninﬂationmorethandoubles: frombelow0.8toabove1.6. Inotherwords,
15Recall that δ in equation (9), which is held ﬁxed for these experiments, also is a function of α.


























































Figure 1: Optimal Policy and Loss Evaluation as a function of Exchange-Rate Pass Through
over a fairly small range of the exchange-rate pass-through parameter, the nature of optimal monetary
policy changes dramatically. Quantitatively similar results occur with a weight of 0.05 on the output gap.
As society places greater relative weight on the exchange rate stabilization objective, the region cor-
respondingtotheinﬂation“dove”behaviorgetssmaller—butneverdisappearscompletelyintheneigh-
borhood of χ = 0.2 to 0.3. However, in the 0.4 to 0.6 range, these results also imply extraordinarily high
relative weights on inﬂation for the optimal policy: often in the range of 2 to 5.
The main implication of this experiment is that the speciﬁcation of optimal policy very sensitive
to small variation in the degree of exchange-rate pass through (or, more generally, the combination of
pass-through and the degree of openness). Since accurately estimating the extent of exchange-rate pass
through is difﬁcult, and its value may change over time (or across states of nature), these results suggest
a much more complicated problem exists for policy makers in small open economies — even in the
absence of an explicit role for the exchange rate in society’s objective function. As with Monacelli (2003),
these results stand in contrast to the “isomorphism” result of Clarida et al. (2001).
154 Conclusions
In contrast with more industrialized economies that have adopted inﬂation targeting, many emerging
market economies (EMEs) have only limited experience with inﬂation targeting. Korea was among the
ﬁrst of the emerging markets to implement an explicit inﬂation target, following the Financial Crisis of
late 1997. In the years since, many Korean macroeconomic aggregates, including inﬂation, were more
volatile than they were prior to the Crisis. We develop and simulate a dynamic stochastic equilibrium
model for a small open economy, calibrated to Korean data, to investigate the effects of various targeting
regimes. In contrast with some other ﬁndings in the literature, we ﬁnd inﬂation targeting to be substan-
tially better at minimizing ﬂuctuations that adversely impact social welfare relative to nominal income
growth targeting and exchange rate targeting.
For many EMEs, recent research suggests that “fear of ﬂoating” is an important aspect of monetary
policy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Korean ofﬁcials have been concerned about the value of the
won since the Crisis, and have been active in stabilizing the currency. Moreover, our model of produc-
tion, in which imports serve as intermediate goods, can motivate an explicit concern for the value of the
currency in an inﬂation targeting regime. We investigate the implications of such factors in an optimiz-
ingpolicyframeworkandﬁndthatinﬂationtargetingisstillpreferredtootherpolicyregimes,evenwhen
society places as much weight on stabilizing the exchange rate as it does on stabilizing inﬂation.
For baseline parameter values, the optimal inﬂation targeting policy for a discretionary central bank
in our small open economy model is to behave more “conservatively” than society with respect to both
inﬂation and the exchange rate — that is, to assign greater weight to these objectives for its loss function
than society does. The nature of these results is insensitive to the degree of inﬂation persistence built
into the open-economy price setting relationship through backward-looking (“rule-of-thumb”) inﬂation
expectations. However, changes in the degree of exchange rate pass through in this equation have a
signiﬁcant non-linear effect on the speciﬁcation of optimal policy. In particular, for a model otherwise
calibrated to the baseline parameter values, a range of moderate values for the pass through coefﬁcient
result in optimal policy being characterized as the discretionary central bank pursuing a less aggres-
sive stance on inﬂation vis-à-vis the preferences of society. Moreover, the optimal weight on inﬂation
doubles — and shifts from an inﬂation “dove” to a “hawk” — over a very narrow range of values for the
degree of exchange rate pass through. We interpret these ﬁndings to suggest that, for emerging market
economies, inﬂation targeting should not be perceived — nor posited — as a “one-size-ﬁts-all” policy.
16A Appendix: Parameter Values
Baseline parameter values for the model are based primarily on Korean data and sources. The elasticity
between domestic goods and imported goods in the production function (ρ) is set to 5 so as to produce
variability of the model economy comparable with that in the data from 1987Q2 to 2000Q4. In line with
the literature, the time discount rate (β) and coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (σ) are assigned values
of 0.99 and 5, respectively.16 Following Park and Shin (2000), we set the mark-up ratio ( θ
θ−1) to 11% so
that the elasticity of demand for consumption varieties (θ) equals 10.09. The average of the import share
of GDP (Q(IM
Y )) over this period was equal to 0.20, implying that δ = ( θ
θ−1)×Q(IM
Y ) ≈ 0.222. During the
same period, the average consumption share of GDP (sc) was 0.786.
The elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate (ηq) is set to 0.538, following Lee and Kim (1991).
They estimated an export equation by regressing export volume on the real exchange rate and control
variables. The estimated elasticity does not reﬂect changes in the price (implying this is its maximum
possible value). We set the elasticity of exports to foreign income (ηy∗) to 1, in light of the fact that
exports have a sizable effect on the Korean economy.
The coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation in the price-setting equation, λ, is set to 0.5 per Fuhrer and Moore
(1995). In section 3 we test the sensitivity of this assumption by varying λ from 0 to 1. The coefﬁcient
of the output gap in the Phillips curve (φ) is set to 0.086 as in McCallum and Nelson (2001). The import
price component of the Phillips curve, χ, represents the degree of pass-through, and is a function of the
production parameter, ρ, and the degree of openness, α. In our baseline parameterization we set χ to
0.79 to coincide with the estimates from Choi (2000), who estimated the coefﬁcient of the exchange rate
in the import price equation. In section 3, we consider variation in χ between 0 to 1 as a sensitivity test.
Following Nam and Pyo (1997), we specify domestic and foreign technological shock processes such
that AR(1) coefﬁcient of the domestic technology shock (ρa) is given as 0.89, and that of the foreign
output (technology) shock (ρy∗) as 0.81. We parameterize the standard deviations of the domestic (σa)
and foreign technological shocks (σy∗) to equal 0.02 and 0.0075, respectively. The AR(1) coefﬁcient on
the preference shock process (ρν) is set to 0.3 and its standard deviation (σν) to 0.01. Those values are
close to values reported by McCallum and Nelson (1998). The AR(1) coefﬁcient of risk premium process
(ρκ) is set to 0.50 and its standard deviation (σκ) to 0.04, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999). The cost-
push shock process, µt, is assumed to be white noise (i.e. ρµ = 0) and we set its standard deviation (σµ)
16The optimal policy results are fairly insensitive to the value of σ.
17Table A.1: Baseline Parameter Values for Model Simulation
Parameter Description Value
β Time discount rate 0.99
σ Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion 5
θ Elasticity of demand for consumption varieties 10.09
















sc Consumption share of GDP 0.786
ηq Elasticity of exports to real exchange rate 0.538
ηy∗ Elasticity of exports to foreign income 1
λ Weight on lagged and expected future πt in Phillips Curve 0.5
φ Slope of Phillips curve 0.086
χ Import price component of Phillips Curve 0.79
ρa AR(1) coefﬁcient of productivity process, at 0.89
ρν AR(1) coefﬁcient of preference process, νt 0.30
ρµ AR(1) coefﬁcient of cost-push inﬂation process, µt 0
ρκ AR(1) coefﬁcient of risk premium process, κt 0.50
ρy∗ AR(1) coefﬁcient of foreign income process, y∗
t 0.81
σa Standard deviation of productivity shock, εa
t 0.02
σν Standard deviation of preference shock, εν
t 0.01
σµ Standard deviation of cost-push inﬂation shock, ε
µ
t 0.0015
σκ Standard deviation of risk premium shock, εκ
t 0.04
σy∗ Standard deviation of foreign output shock, ε
y∗
t 0.0075
to 0.015, as in Jensen (2002).
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